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ABSTRACT
The precautionary principle, invoking the notions of risk, scientific 
uncertainty and irreversible damage, takes the solution of the environmental 
issues of the global risk society to the legal domain. Its application in 
international law has evolved significantly, especially with respect to the 
protection of the marine environment. This principle, which was much 
ignored in its practical application, is gradually being used in international 
environmental protection. The purpose of this paper is to analyze how 
the jurisprudence of the ITLOS has contributed to the development and 
application of the precautionary principle for the protection of the marine 
environment and how the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
contributed to the development of this principle in international law. Thus, 
although we are still not able to safely say that the precautionary approach 
is included in international law as an unchallenged principle, it has been 
given great steps over the last few years in this direction. Particularly with 
the contributions of the international jurisprudence of the ITLOS, the 
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precautionary approach is evolving and becoming an autonomous principle, 
with less uncertainty and subjectivity that caused so much apprehension 
for the States and doubt in the doctrine. 
Keywords: Precautionary Principle; International Environmental Law; 
Protection of the Marine Environment.
A APLICAÇÃO DO PRINCÍPIO DA PRECAUÇÃO NO DIREITO 
INTERNACIONAL: UMA ANÁLISE DA CONTRIBUIÇÃO DO 
TRIBUNAL INTERNACIONAL PARA O DIREITO DO MAR
RESUMO
O princípio da precaução, ao invocar as noções de risco, incerteza científica 
e danos irreversíveis, chama à esfera jurídica a solução de questões 
ambientais da sociedade de risco global. Assim, a sua aplicação no direito 
internacional vem evoluindo de forma significativa, sobretudo no que diz 
respeito à proteção do ambiente marinho. Ganhando novos contornos, o 
princípio que ficou por muito tempo renegado de aplicabilidade prática, 
vem aos poucos sendo cada vez mais invocado para a proteção ambiental 
internacional. O objetivo deste artigo é analisar como o principio da 
precaução atua na proteção internacional do ambiente, em especial dos 
mares e oceanos e qual a contribuição do Tribunal Internacional para o 
Direito do Mar no desenvolvimento deste princípio no direito internacional. 
Assim, se ainda não se pode afirmar de forma segura que a precaução 
está inserida no direito internacional como um princípio inconteste, nos 
últimos anos tem caminhado a passos largos para isto. Sobretudo com 
as contribuições da jurisprudência internacional, em especial do TIDM, 
a precaução tem se desenvolvido e tomado forma como um princípio 
autônomo, diminuindo suas incertezas e subjetividades que tanto temor 
causou nos Estados e dúvidas na doutrina.
Palavras-chave: Princípio da Precaução; Direito Ambiental Internacional; 
Proteção do Ambiente Marinho.
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INTRODUCTION - THE RISK SOCIETY
It was during the 1960s that discussions regarding the protection 
of the marine environment began to spread in the international community; 
these discussions were particularly influenced by disasters and accidents 
with irreversible consequences (GALIZZI; HERKLOTZ, 2010, p. 87; 
LOUKA, 2006, p. 27). It is at that time in history that an epistemological 
rupture started to occur in the use of resources, and scientific uncertainty 
began to characterize environmental issues (WEISS, 1992, p. 15). 
Technological progress, in addition to economic and social progress, also 
led to a globalization of the risks (GOMES, 2000, p. 16). That means that 
we lost the exact notion of the effects caused by the exploration of natural 
resources. It became clear that environmental damage could project their 
effects in time without certainty and control of the level of danger. This 
is evident in the case of oil tankers that sank and kept spilling oil in the 
environment for decades.1 Therefore, the future risk of damage is currently 
an element that characterizes all the global environmental concerns 
(NOLLKAEMPER, 1996, p. 91; SCHIOCCHET; LIEDKE, 2012,  p. 109-
131).
In this sense, the concept of a “risk society”2, which was 
coined by German sociologist Ulrich Beck, is crucially important. The 
development of his thesis allowed the environmental and technological 
risks to be ranked as the main concern of the world with the start of the 
so-called second modernity (HOGEMANN, 2015, p. 128-129). To Beck, 
the replacement of the first modernity by the reflexive modernization 
(second modernity) meant a paradigm shift from a “class society” to a “risk 
society” (BECK, 1992, p. 14-23). Therefore, the risk issue was placed at 
the center of the contemporary social theory, based on the criticism of 
Marxist-influenced sociological theories, which up to that moment tried to 
explain the modern community based on an industrial class society.3 This 
perspective maintains that what is discussed, in this new context, is the 
manner in which the damage that results from the production of goods can 
1 The vessels Arizona and Jacob Luckenbach continue to spill oil in the marine environment even after 
more than 50 years since the accidents took place. About the matter, see CASTILLO, 2005, p. 226.
2 The concept was developed in his book Risikogesellschaft. Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne of 
1986. The English version: BECK, 1992.
3 As written by BORGES, 2016, p. 2: “En ce sens, ‘la société du risque ne peut pas être considérée 
comme une option qui pourrait être choisie ou rejetée, dans le cadre du débat politique’, car les risques 
qui accompagnent les nouvelles technologies sont des conséquences directes et automatiques de la 
modernisation, dans ‘un processus autonome qui est sourd et muet quant à ses dangers’.
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be distributed (LEITE, 2012, p. 193).
 In sum, the concept of a risk society is crucial to the 
analysis of the environmental problems. One can list the characteristics of 
the environmental risks of the second modernity in the following manner: 
a) they are essentially global and, as a result, they must be managed by 
the entire international community;4 b) they are of a very serious nature 
and are irreversible, as a general rule. Therefore, the compensatory and 
corrective measures for the damages are mostly ineffective;5 c) they are 
the result of political decisions (either for lack of new technologies, by 
developed policies that are now outdated) and so they must be regulated by 
human decisions. That is, they are human creations that must be controlled 
by humanity; d) they reach everybody (normally more than one country is 
affected, and when that is not the case, the consequences are generally not 
restricted to a certain State or location), regardless of what caused them 
(CASTILLO, 2005, p. 215).
As the idea of risk is crucial to the analysis of environmental 
problems, the sciences and the law must have a position to avoid damage, 
instead of merely trying to repair it. Thus, based on the acknowledgement 
that society has come up with unacceptable risks without being able to take 
the appropriate measures to control the situation, the law is called upon 
to provide answers (see PRITTWITZ, 2012, p. 415-428). In a proactive 
manner, it is necessary to shift the focus from mitigation and reparation to a 
preventive attitude. The law, in addition to regulating the current situations 
and activities, must also try to establish rules for future situations. As a direct 
result of this risk and the rise of uncertainty, environmental international 
law needs to anticipate risks to prevent the occurrence of irreparable 
damage to the environment (HARDING; FISHER, 1999, p. 10).
4 About the matter, according to GOMES, 2011, p. 141, the risk went from exceptional (circumscribed 
to a reduced number of sectors...) to special (relating to especially dangerous activities and starting the 
responsibility for the risk) and finally, in our times, the general rule, especially in public health and the 
environment (when translated into a generalized threat).
5 We may cite here as an example, among so many others, the ballast water case: ZANELLA, 2010, p. 
22: “Contrary to other forms of marine pollution, like oil spills, in which the mitigation measures can 
be taken and the environment can eventually recover, the introduction of marine species is, in most 
cases, irreversible and not perceptible in the short term. Thus, when observing that an exotic species 
has been introduced, it is almost always too late to take measures”. (translated freely. All texts in Por-
tuguese have been translated freely by the author).
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1 THE AUTONOMY OF THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE AS 
AN INDEPENDENT PRINCIPLE OF PREVENTION 
The arising of new technologies has reached a stage in which it 
can no longer safely organize the development, so that uncertainty with 
respect to technological innovations gives way to unpredictable risks.6 
These uncertainties, according to Ulrich Beck, can lead to two types of 
risks: a) the concrete or demonstrated risk, in which there are estimated 
risks for a certain activity, so that there is a possibility of taking preventive 
measures to act when a disaster is imminent. That is, notwithstanding the 
fact that it is not certain that it will happen, we know the likelihood or 
the size of what may happen; b) the abstract or potential risk, in which 
there is no telling what the possible damage might do. This abstract 
risk is that which is invisible and unpredictable to human knowledge, 
although it is likely that the risk exists via similarity or evidence, however 
incomprehensible (BECK, 1992, p. 34). In other words, it is a “risk of a 
risk”, and may eventually never come to fruition. It is by differentiating 
between these two types of risks that we have the autonomy of prevention 
as an independent precautionary principle.
In both types of principles, we have the element of risk, but in 
a different setting. Despite the close connection between the prevention 
and the precautionary principle, the first is about the adoption of measures 
that are necessary to take care of foreseeable events, or, in this case, 
probability; whereas the second is devoted to managing the risks that are 
not directly predictable.7 Therefore, prevention has to do with averting the 
risk for potential damage, trying to prevent a knowingly dangerous activity 
from producing the undesirable effects. The precautionary principle, on the 
other hand, acts on averting the risk of a potential danger, which means that 
a certain behavior or activity is dangerous in abstract terms.8
As Professor Carla Amado Gomes summarized it, “the prevention 
6 In this aspect, HERMITTE, 2005, p. 15: “The risk society introduced, between the two poles of 
predictability and unpredictability, characteristics of the simple causality of modern times – scientific 
uncertainty and perplexity”. 
7 As written by RANDEGGER, 2007, p. 163, differentiating the principles: “The principle of preven-
tion is applied to situations with a known cause-effect relationship and therefore a clearly defined risk. 
(...) The precautionary approach, on the other hand, addresses situations of scientific uncertainty”.
8 On the matter, PEREIRA DA SILVA, 2009, p. 12: says “The purpose of the prevention principle is to 
avoid damage to the environment, which implies an ability to anticipate situations that are potentially 
dangerous, natural or human in origin, capable of putting the environmental components in risk, so 
as to allow the adoption of more suitable means to ward off its verification or, at least, to reduce its 
consequences”. 
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principle can be translated as: in the imminence of a human action that will 
seriously and irreversibly damage environmental assets, this intervention 
must be made” (GOMES, 2000, p. 22). The precautionary principle, in 
turn, according to Professor Canotilho, “means that the environment must 
have on its side the benefit of the doubt when there is uncertainty, for lack 
of clear scientific evidence, about the causal nexus between an activity 
and a certain environmental pollution or degradation phenomenon” 
(CANOTILHO, 1998, p. 48). Or also, in the words of Professor Vasco 
Pereira da Silva: “in a society in which you have more and more risk 
factors for Nature [...], the shortage and continuity of natural resources 
make a compelling case for the legal application of the common sense rule 
of ‘better safe than sorry” (PEREIRA DA SILVA, 2009, p. 12).
In international law, many instruments establish prevention as a 
guiding principle in the protection of the environment. The examples are: 
the Convention on the High Seas, signed in Geneva in 1958, which sets 
forth the obligation to take preventive measures in order to avoid maritime 
contamination by radioactive residue;9 and the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, which establishes the duty to prevent 
pollution in areas that are beyond the sovereignty of the States caused by 
activities performed under their jurisdiction.10
The precautionary principle appeared for the first time in the 
international scene in 1987 during the Second International North Sea 
Conference on marine pollution.11 For this reason, it can be said that “the 
precautionary principle is an idea that came from the law of the seas” 
(MOSEDALE, 1997, p. 224). Since then, other international texts include 
precaution as a behavioral12 duty of the State.13 Citations include: the 1990 
Bergen Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development; principle 
15 of the Rio Declaration; Article 3 of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change; and paragraph 22.5 of Agenda 21 (see 
GILLESPIE, 2007, p. 67-70).
Even with the existence of a conceptual distinction – often 
9 Convention on the High Seas. In.: Geneva Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1958. Art. 25, para-
graph 1.
10 LOSC. Art. 194, paragraph 2.
11 The origin of the concept dates back to the German legislation (“vorsorgeprinzip”) of 1976, which 
reiterates the terms of the Wingspread Declaration of 1970. In this sense, SCHRIJVER, 2008, p. 184.
12 See BORGES, 20016. In his book he conducted an interesting investigation about the prevention 
and precaution principles as an obligation of behavior and an obligation of result. 
13  According to TROUWBORST, 2009, p. 27: “Currently, the precautionary principle can be found in 
or under more than 60 multilateral environmental treaties, as well as a myriad of political declarations, 
resolutions and action programmes, covering a great variety of issue areas”.
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ambiguous and not very clear – created by the doctrine and cited in several 
international documents as autonomous forms, several authors do not 
distinguish between the two principles.14 There are also those who regard 
the precautionary principle as a simple variation of the duty to prevent, 
that is, a natural continuation. As stated by Faure and Niessen: “The 
precautionary principle is nothing more than an extension of the prevention 
principle (...)” (FAURE; NIESSEN, 2006, p. 46). The close connection 
between the two cannot be denied, because both work with the idea of 
anticipating risks, but the precautionary principle goes beyond the classical 
logic of the preventive approach to a new culture of risk, as it is applied in a 
context of uncertainty. In the classical prevention logic, only a proven risk 
justifies the adoption of early measures. That is, only after recognizing the 
possibility of damage can the international law regulate a certain activity 
to prevent its occurrence; whereas, in the precautionary logic, there is no 
direct prediction for possible damage (SAGE-FULLER, 2013, p. 68).
Despite the similarities, at least two fundamental differences 
make these two principles independent of each other. First, the preventive 
approach is applied to risks that are fully understood, or at least they are 
likely, whereas the precautionary approach works with possible risks, 
which are not known for sure, that is, the effects of such an activity on 
the environment are not entirely known (KISS, 1996, p. 27). Second, the 
modus operandi of the precautionary principle is completely different 
from the one in prevention, because it does not have the purpose to be 
applied ad infinitum (MARTIN, 2005, p. 2224). In these terms, science has 
a completely different role in precaution than it has in prevention. From 
the moment that technological progress and uncertainties are reduced, 
precaution loses its role, as the risks and damage of each activity become 
known. Thus, the level of scientific knowledge will determine if it is a case 
of applying prevention or precaution – or neither (TROUWBORST, 2009, 
p. 119).
2 THE MODUS OPERANDI OF THE PRECAUTIONARY 
PRINCIPLE IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
As was said before, the modus operandi of the precautionary 
principle is completely different from that of prevention, and it carries its 
very own unique characteristics. At this point, two very peculiar aspects 
14 See BODANSKY, 2004, Chapter 16, at 381-391.
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of precaution will be studied in the way they operate in international 
environmental law. First, the so-called in dubio pro natura will be analyzed, 
in which the benefit of the doubt always falls on the environment. Then, 
the matter of shifting the burden of proof will be investigated, as it is a 
crucial precept for the autonomy of precaution as a principle that belongs 
to international environmental law.
2.1 The Benefit of the Doubt and the Risk of Error in Favor of the 
Environment – in dubio pro natura  
The precautionary principle has very peculiar characteristics, and 
it has its own way of operating in international environmental law. First, 
once again, we need to bear in mind that the damage to the environment 
– especially for the seas and the oceans – is, as a general rule, hard or 
impossible to correct. Therefore, proactive and safe actions are required. 
Having said that, the adoption of this principle for every possibility in the 
urge to prevent each and every risk could result in ineffectiveness and 
could stop all human activities.15
The strict application of the precautionary approach – as small 
as the level of damage caused by an act may be – could cause its own 
collapse, because using it for every risk would be materially impossible. In 
these terms, its adoption would lead to a complete distortion of its purpose, 
because only the activities that provided absolute certainty of harmlessness 
would be freely executed (TINKER, 1996, p. 67). This possibility would 
be completely unrealistic, and the concept of a risk society would be totally 
inverted. In sum, the precautionary approach used in absolute terms would 
result in a hypertrophy of “not doing”, which would cause a complete 
social paralysis (AREOSA, 2008, p. 4).
In view of this situation, the precautionary principle may initially 
operate in international environmental law in two distinct ways: a) only 
being admitted when there is scientific certainty that a certain activity puts 
the environment in risk and has a high probability of causing damage to 
the environment; b) being accepted in the absence of scientific certainty 
about the possibility of damage, and uncertainty as to the results of such an 
activity would be enough for its application (GOMES, 2000, p. 35).
15 About the matter, Professor Vasco Pereira da Silva says that the idea of precaution as an in dubio 
pro natura principle is inadequate because it carries an excessively inhibiting load, as it is impossible 
to have “zero risk” in the environmental area. PEREIRA DA SILVA, 2001, p.19; PEREIRA DA SILVA, 
2003, p. 69-70. 
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If the first option is used, the precautionary approach fades away 
as an autonomous principle, and it becomes the same – or it becomes a 
simple branch – as prevention, as they would have the same practical 
application in international law. The second option, in turn, could result in 
its lack of application and operation, because – if it is not regulated in very 
effective terms – it could be applied to each and every human act, causing 
the so-called “social hypertrophy” (ZANDER, 2010, p. 14).
However, it is not about being better safe than sorry at any cost. 
It is about in dubio pro natura.16 That is, the environment is given the 
benefit of the doubt when there is uncertainty with respect to the effects of 
a certain activity on it. In these terms, when it is unclear whether or not a 
certain activity can cause serious damage to the environment, the risk of 
error must be favored. That is, in case of doubt, it is better to run the risk in 
terms of protecting the environment, because without running the risk, you 
are possibly exposing the environment to irreparable damage.
Taking the approach of early intervention is required to prevent 
possible damage to the environment in the cases in which the best 
information available is not able to confirm the level of damage of the 
activity.17 Having said that, the question then becomes: how do we know 
the reasonable motives of concern in order to apply the precautionary 
principle, as there is no zero risk in international environmental law? In 
this sense, there is no calculated answer for this question, considering the 
many variables that must be taken into account to decide whether or not to 
apply the precautionary principle in a certain situation. It is only on a case-
by-case basis that we are able to define if the activity is reasonable.
However, a few parameters serve as guiding principles to apply 
such an approach in environmental international law: a) a minimum 
probability of causing environmental damage; b) the severity of the possible 
damage (TROUWBORST, 2009, p. 110). In these terms, for its use, we 
need to take into consideration the ratio between these two requirements 
and the real effectiveness of the precautionary measures to be adopted. The 
ratio and the effectiveness must ponder – always analyzing the probability 
and the severity – if the actions correspond to the magnitude of the risks 
involved, in order to avoid the adoption of excessively strict measures. 
This way, the greater the added risk, the more rigorous the preventive 
16 Expression used by several authors, particularly by TROUWBORST, 2006, p. 190; GOMES, 2000, 
p. 37, prefers the expression “in dubio pro ambiente”.
17 TROUWBORST, 2009, p. 110 says: “‘In dubio pro natura’ and ‘erring on the side of environmental 
protection’ accurately reflect the gist of the precautionary principle in general international law”.
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measure, and vice-versa.18
Once again, these parameters must always analyze the concrete 
case, under penalty of total ineffectiveness of the principle in the 
international society. That is, the precautionary approach always has to 
consider the costs and the benefits of each precautionary measure to be 
adopted, because the dangers of a misuse of the principle may result in 
unnecessarily alarmist actions (DOYLE; CARNEY, 1999, p. 47.19 The 
Rio Declaration itself, in principle 15, emphasizes that the precautionary 
approach is only to be used “where there are threats of serious or irreversible 
damage” and that the precautionary measures must be “cost-effective”20 to 
be applied in international law. 
2.2 Shifting the Burden of Proof 
Another issue is very controversial in international environmental 
law, namely the burden of proof of the possible damage. To be more 
precise, the precautionary approach brings a reversal of this burden to 
prove the damage, that is, with the use of this principle, it is up to the agent 
of the possible damage (or the public authority that authorized the activity 
– such as the State responsible for it) to prove that it will not damage 
the environment (GARCIA, 1994, p. 106; GULLETT, 1997, p. 59-60). 
Such a statement entails, once again, enormous risk of social paralysis and 
inefficacy of the principle in international law, “considering that the proof 
of the absolute harmlessness of the eventually polluting activity would 
be a real diabolica probation” (GOMES, 2000, p. 38). In other words, 
shifting the burden of proof must be applied with caution as it might be 
impossible to paralyze every activity before proving that it would not harm 
the environment.21
On the other hand, without this shift, the precautionary approach 
would be extremely limited (GONZALEZ-LAXE, 2005, p. 496). If the 
duty of the burden does not fall on the possible polluting agent, there is 
18 About the matter, TROUWBORST, 2009, p. 110 says: “Various guidelines help establish what, 
in concrete instances, constitutes effective and proportional action. Such action should, among other 
things, be (1) timely; (2) tailored to the circumstances of the case; and (3) regularly reviewed and 
maintained as long as necessary to prevent the harm involved, but not longer”.
19  See Doyle and Carney supra note 26, at 47.
20 The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 1992. Principle 15.
21 See GILLESPIE, 2007, p. 71, note n. 68, who says that there are proponents of a weak approach and 
those who believe that the precautionary approach must be used in a stronger fashion. According to the 
author, one of the first dilemmas is precisely the reversal of the burden of proof.
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simply no one to prove its damaging character. That is, the precautionary 
approach would remain only an autonomous guiding principle of 
international environmental law. The scientific uncertainty of the effects 
of a certain activity on the environment is a sine qua non condition of the 
precautionary approach. Therefore, whoever undertakes the duty to analyze 
the consequences of an activity must be the one who wishes to properly 
scrutinize this activity so that there is greater protection and environmental 
safety. Otherwise, it would be up to the one suffering from the possible 
consequences to prove the damage of each activity and exploration that 
might harm its environment, which would be impractical (GOMES, 2000, 
p. 36).
Also, if this obligation of producing evidence and scientific 
certainty would fall on the ones suffering from the damage, what would 
happen if, on account of inertia, lack of technology or even lack of will, 
nothing was proved? That is, if the proof was not produced and it was not 
proven that the activity is harmless nor that it is harmful? Would the activity 
be prohibited based on the precautionary approach, because that, without 
the certainty of the results, it would be forbidden? This way we would 
go back to the biggest problem and the risk of the irrational use of this 
principle, because no activity would be allowed without the suffering party 
having to demonstrate first the possible consequences to the environment. 
The environment would depend on the goodwill of the subject – who 
often can be found not to take interest or be afraid of suffering irreversible 
environmental damage – to prove that a certain activity may or may not be 
conducted in his area.22
There is still a great deal of divergence with respect to shifting the 
burden of proof, especially in the jurisprudence. In practice, the international 
and national courts have varied significantly in their decisions. Although 
the doctrine has moved toward an understanding that the shift is necessary 
for the effectuation of the precautionary approach and for more protection 
of the environment,23 many courts, especially international courts, have 
22 An example of its implementation can be found in Annex I (The Principle of Precautionary Action) 
of the “Final Declaration of the First European Seas At Risk Conference”, Copenhagen, 26-28 Octo-
ber 1994: “3. The burden of proof is shifted from the regulator to the person or persons responsible for 
the potentially harmful activity, who will now have to demonstrate that their actions are/will not cause 
harm to the environment”.
23 Several authors disagree with such a shift, and even with the precautionary approach being an 
autonomous principle of international environmental law. For example, CAMERON; ABOUCHAR, 
1991; BODANSKY, 2004, p. 390-391; SAND, 2000, p. 448, who understands that shifting the burden 
of proof would be the “most radical variant” of the precautionary principle.
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difficulty in applying this.24
We can mention the 2010 International Court of Justice (ICJ) case 
of the pulp mill at the Uruguay River, in which the parties were Argentina 
and Uruguay.25 In summary, Argentina questioned the construction and 
production of a pulp mill on a river that borders both countries, based on 
a bilateral agreement. Argentina argued that, based on the precautionary 
principle, the mill could not operate in such a location, because it could pose 
a serious risk of irreparable environmental damage.26 Therefore, Argentina 
said that the burden to prove whether or not there were serious risks of 
damage to the environment was on Uruguay, and until it was proven that 
such an  undertaking did not represent a real threat to the environment, 
they should shut it down. However, ICJ explicitly denied the reversal of 
the burden of proof in this case and kept the mill in operation, even without 
knowing exactly the consequences of such activity (KAZHDAN, 2011, 
p. 528). The ICJ’s judgment was based on extremely technical aspects of 
the bilateral agreement – which did not contemplate the reversal of the 
burden of proof – and not on the broad application of the precautionary 
principle.27
The World Trade Organization (WTO) also had the chance to 
analyze the precautionary principle and the reversal of the burden of proof. 
However, the legal bodies of the WTO have consistently assigned the 
burden of proof to the complainant (HORN; MAVROIDIS, 2009, p. 115). 
This is the case of the hormones in cattle meat in which the European 
Union prohibited imported North American and Canadian meat treated 
with hormones (EC Measures, 1998). The WTO reviewed the case and 
understood that the burden to prove that the food was harmful to human 
health was on the complainant (EC Measures, 1998, p. 35-40). It also 
24 It is not our purpose here to provide an in-depth analysis of the way the national courts of each coun-
try apply the precautionary principle and the shift of the burden of proof; however, as an example, we 
can mention the text by Jacqueline Peel on the application of this principle in the Australian jurispru-
dence: PEEL, 2009, p. 21: “If the two conditions precedent or thresholds of the precautionary principle 
were met, the legal result, according to the court, was to shift the burden of proof to the development 
proponent to demonstrate that the ‘threat does not in fact exist or is negligible’”.
25 ICJ Reports. Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay). 4 May 2006. Available 
at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/135/15877.pdf. Accessed 17 January 2017. About the case, see 
KAZHDAN, 2011, p. 527-552. 
26 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay – Argentina v. Uruguay – ICJ – Oral Proceedings, CR 2009/12, 
p. 66, para. 28: “Even if the risks of serious harm may in some circumstance appear to be merely 
potential, the precautionary principle requires “[the adoption of] cost-effective measures to prevent 
environmental degradation” (“l’adoption de mesures effectives visant à prévenir la dégradation de 
l’environnement”). Available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/135/15471.pdf . Accessed 17 Janu-
ary 2016.
27 ICJ Reports. Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay). at 61, para. 164.
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considered that the precautionary principle needed to be better regulated 
internationally to be applied in international trade, but said that this principle 
could be used in exclusively environmental issues (EC Measures, 1998, p. 
45-46, par. 123). 28
We also have to mention the case law of the International Tribunal 
for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) on the matter. The reality is that the Tribunal 
has not explicitly made its view of the shift of the burden of proof in the 
application of the precautionary principle public. On 1 February 2011, the 
ITLOS, in an advisory opinion on the “Responsibilities and obligations of 
states sponsoring persons and entities with respect to activities in the Area” 
(ITLOS, 2011), strongly stressed the application of the precautionary 
approach; however, it did not mention the possibility of shifting the burden 
of proof. We analyze this opinion further, because of its huge importance 
to the use of the precautionary principle in the law of the sea.29
3 THE PRECAUTIONARY APPROACH AS A GUIDING PRINCIPLE 
FOR THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION OF THE SEA – 
FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 
So far, this paper has analyzed the precautionary principle 
in general theoretical terms and investigated its new meanings for the 
international environmental law. Now, let us study how these theoretical 
aspects are applied in international law for the environmental protection, 
especially the marine environment. The purpose now is to study how the 
international practice has used the precautionary principle to protect the 
marine environment from pollution and degradation. 
In this sense, once again we can say that the precautionary 
approach is an idea that came from the law of the sea and quickly spread 
to other international conventions. However, even though it is posited in 
several texts, the exact definition and the way it was used in international 
28 This same position was repeated by the WTO panel on the Biotech case in 2006. EC Measures 
Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, WTO 29 September 2006, WT/DS291/R, 
WT/DS292/R, WT/DS291/R. In this case, it was said that the precautionary principle is established in 
many international treaties, but almost exclusively for the environment. In addition, the principle has 
been referred to and applied by the national States in domestic environmental law.
29 In addition to this opinion, the ITLOS, in other cases, that the precautionary principle should be a 
guiding principle of marine law. We may cite here the Southern Bluefin Tuna case and the MOX Plant 
Case. Even if the merits of the cases were not analyzed, the ITLOS could reaffirm the importance of 
the precautionary approach for the marine environment. Because in none of these cases the ITLOS 
analyzed the shift of the burden of proof, these cases are not addressed here. We analyze specifically 
the jurisprudence of the ITLOS on the precautionary approach and both cases are studied in depth.  
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law went through a phase of uncertainty and great controversy (MARR, 
2003, p. 21). Some authors include the precautionary approach in the list of 
general principles of law, whereas others prefer to include it in customary 
rules (MOSEDALE, 1997, p. 221) and others even deny its status as a 
legal principle due to its great inaccuracy (CHARMIAN, 1998, p. 509; 
FITZGERALD; ELLIS, 2004, p. 779 – 800). Particularly in the 1990s 
and at the beginning of the 21st century, when the principle appeared in 
international conventions, without a clear definition of its application, 
a great number of legal scholars were concerned about accepting the 
precautionary approach as an imperative principle of law.30
Besides, the greatest contestants of the precautionary approach 
have always been the States themselves, which, afraid of its limitless use, 
preferred to see it as a mere guideline (MACDONALD, 1995, p. 269) and 
not as a binding principle. The fear of the States was justified in view 
of the initial uncertainties about the mode of utilization, apparently very 
subjective, with the potential of preventing each and every activity for 
merely not having concrete data about the environmental consequences. 
That is, in the urge to preven each and every risk that might stop every human 
activity, a social hypertrophy of “not doing” would result (BODANSKY, 
2004, p. 384-385).
However, the uncertainties gradually dissipated, and the 
precautionary approach started to be developed, particularly in the case law, 
as a guiding principle of international environmental law, with aspects that 
are more precise and objective. The law of the sea has had an important role 
in this evolution. It was in this legal field that the precautionary approach 
came to existence and evolved with greater accuracy (SAGE-FULLER, 
2013, p. 62; FOSTER, 2011, p. 138; CHAZOURNES, 2007, p. 25). Thus, 
we now analyze how the precautionary approach is applied to protect the 
seas.
30 About the matter, GOMES, 2000, p. 211 says: “To us, the greatest risk of assumption of precaution 
as a principle – although with the entire vagueness of a principle, by definition, has – is of the tendency 
to overvalue certain values – maxim, in which here it directly matters, the natural resources – to the 
detriment of others, abstracting any ponderation and in the absence of minimally conclusive scientific 
proof”. 
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3.1 The Jurisprudence of the ITLOS in the application of 
the Precautionary Approach for the protection of the marine 
environment 
It is precisely in the ITLOS that, over the last few years, the 
precautionary approach has developed the most and was applied as a 
guiding principle of marine protection and in international environmental 
law. For this reason, the jurisprudential analysis of the ITLOS is imperative 
on this matter. We study three cases analyzed by the ITLOS that have this 
important role: the Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, the MOX Plant Case, 
and the Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and 
Entities with Respect to Activities in the Area.
3.1.1 The Southern Bluefin Tuna Case
The ITLOS was called upon in 1999 by Australia and New 
Zealand against Japan31 to settle a controversy about the fishing of the 
southern bluefin tuna (ANDO, 2007, p. 867- 876; ROMANO, 2001, p. 
312- 348).32 33 
First, it is necessary to keep in mind that the southern bluefin 
tuna (Thunnus maccoyii) is one of the highly migratory species regulated 
by Article 64 of the LOSC. Therefore, the LOSC already established that 
the States whose nationals fish for this species must cooperate to ensure 
its conservation and promote its optimal utilization in view of the over-
exploitation risks caused by nationals of a State to the harm of the others.34 
For this reason, in 1982, Japan, Australia and New Zealand initiated a 
program to restore the stocks of tuna until the year 2020. Four years later, in 
1986, these States were able to reduce fishing by 40% (ROSENNE, 2000, 
p 464). In view of this great progress, the three States decided to sign, on 
10 May 1993, an international agreement to keep protecting and preserving 
the species and, on 20 May 1994, the Convention for the Conservation of 
31 Despite being about the same subject, Australia and New Zealand called upon the ITLOS separately. 
The ITLOS joined the proceedings to analyze both complaints together (Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases 
(New Zealand v. Japan; Australia v. Japan), Provisional Measures). However, regarding the number-
ing of the cases, the ITLOS refers to the New Zealand case as No. 3 and the Australian case as No. 4. 
32 Also called “Southern Bluefin Tuna”, “Blue Tuna”; or “Southern Tuna”. The scientific name is 
Thunnus maccoyii.
33 Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (New Zealand v. Japan; Australia v. Japan), Provisional Measures. All 
the documents are available at http://www.itlos.org/index.php?id=62&L=1AND1%3D1. Accessed 19 
January 2017.
34 LOSC. Art. 64.
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the Southern Bluefin Tuna was in force.35
However, Japan stated that from 1999 to 2001 it was going 
to conduct a unilateral experimental fishing program on the species, 
increasing exploitation beyond what was established by the Commission 
for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna. The decisions of the 
Commission are made by a unanimous vote of the three members.36 In 
May 1994, when the first meeting of the Commission was held, the Total 
Allowable Catch (TAC) was set at 11,750 tons, divided in the following 
manner: 6,065 tons for Japan; 5,265 tons for Australia; and 420 tons for 
New Zealand.37 However, since 1998, the Commission has not been able 
to reach an agreement on a new TAC (BIALEK, 2000, p. 153). Japan, 
which was not satisfied with the quota, then decided to increase fishing for 
the aforementioned tuna unilaterally through this so-called experimental 
fishing program (MARR, 2000, p. 816).
In view of Japan’s attitude, which is contrary to the Convention 
and to the interests of Australia and New Zealand, both latter States 
requested the constitution of an arbitral tribunal in accordance with Annex 
VII of the LOSC.38 Furthermore, because they needed to put an immediate 
stop to the Japanese catch that went beyond the accorded TAC, these States 
also asked the ITLOS for a provisional measure, pursuant to Article 290, 
paragraph 5 of the LOSC; the arbitral tribunal was not required to analyze 
the merits of the complaint.39
The basis for the request for a provisional measure was the need 
for a precautionary attitude, because it was unknown whether the increase 
in the annual catch would cause irreversible damage to the number of 
southern bluefin tuna in the oceans.40 The main argument was that the 
35 Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna. Available at http://www.ccsbt.org/user-
files/file/docs_english/basic_documents/convention.pdf. Accessed 19 January 2017.
36 Rules of Procedure of the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna. Rule No. 
6.
37 Data available at http://web.archive.org/web/20020612124922/www.ccsbt.org/docs/manage ment.
html. The current TAC data can be found at http://www.ccsbt.org/site/total_allo wable_catch.php. Both 
were accessed 19 January 2017. Currently, South Korea, Taiwan and Indonesia are also members of 
the Commission. 
38 The Arbitral Tribunal is the only mandatory means to solve controversies at the LOSC, that is, only 
this tribunal may be constituted without the consent of the parties. In this interim period, it is worth 
mentioning that the three States were already in 1999 signing members of the LOSC: Japan ratified the 
LOSC on 20 June 1996; Australia did so on 5 October 1994; and New Zealand on 19 July 1996. 
39 The requests for provisional measures were submitted on 30 July 1999: Request for the Prescription 
of Provisional Measures Submitted by Australia; Request for the Prescription of Provisional Measures 
Submitted by New Zealand.
40 Request for the Prescription of Provisional Measures Submitted by New Zealand. p. 8.
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scientific uncertainties about the exploitation of the species beyond the 
quota established in 1994 would not allow anyone to say that the tuna 
would be able to survive so as to at least keep its population stock (MARR, 
2000, p. 816).
In a decision rendered on 27 August 1999, the ITLOS accepted, 
with a majority of votes, the request for a provisional measure. The ITLOS 
ordered, among other measures, the immediate suspension of Japan’s 
experimental fishing program until the arbitral tribunal analyzed the merits 
of the case.41 The ITLOS stated that “the parties should in the circumstances 
act with prudence and caution to ensure that effective conservation measures 
are taken to prevent serious harm to the stock of southern bluefin tuna”.42 
That is, the ITLOS said that, in view of the lack of scientific evidence, 
the exploitation of tuna above the previously established quota could 
cause serious damage to the stock of the species. Therefore, it ordered 
the suspension of the over-exploitation based on “prudence and caution” 
(CHO, 2009, p. 64; STEPHENS, 2010, p. 225).
Although the ITLOS did not expressly mention the precautionary 
principle at any time, and much less worked on the concept, content and 
manner of application, this decision was very important in the development 
of the precautionary approach in international environmental law. First, in 
the matter of marine living resources, for the first time, an international 
court ordered the suspension of an activity based on scientific uncertainty.43 
Second, in doing so, it offered an incentive to fishing nations everywhere 
to cooperate in managing and preserving fishing resources by signing 
multilateral agreements, as stated in the LOSC itself.
This way, in sum, the ITLOS decision in the case of the southern 
bluefin tuna was an important milestone for the evolution of the concept 
and the practical application of the precautionary principle. Even though 
the ITLOS did not analyze and develop the theme with more precision and 
in depth, this decision had the merit of applying the precautionary principle 
in an actual case of conservation of marine natural resources.  
41 Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (New Zealand v. Japan; Australia v. Japan), Provisional Measures. 
Order. 27 August 1999 at 16-17.
42 Ibid. at 14, para. 77.
43 This provisional measure was later struck down by the Arbitral Tribunal in conformity with Annex 
VII of LOSC to decide on the matter of the controversy, which upheld the Japanese position that there 
was no jurisdiction to judge the case (based on LOSC Article 282), because there was a regional treaty 
about the matter. 
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3.1.2 The MOX Plant Case
 
The MOX Plant case44 was a conflict between Ireland and the 
United Kingdom about the construction and operation of a nuclear fuel 
processing plant in Sellafield, located in the northwest of England, at the 
border of the Irish Sea.45 The argument was that the operation of this plant 
had not been duly analyzed and that there were uncertainties with respect 
to the possibility of marine pollution by nuclear waste. Ireland requested 
in June 2001 the constitution of an Ad Hoc Arbitral Tribunal under the 
1992 OSPAR Convention (Convention for the Protection of the Marine 
Environment of the North-East Atlantic) (Regarding the constitution of the 
ad hoc tribunal based on the OSPAR Convention, see VOLBEDA, 2006, p. 
214). In October 2001, it requested the constitution of an Arbitral Tribunal 
according to LOSC Annex VII . However, before analyzing the merits of 
the case, Ireland applied to the ITLOS for provisional measures to order the 
immediate suspension of the activities conducted by the United Kingdom 
in the nuclear plant, because it understood the measure to be urgent and of 
difficult further repair. In the end, the European Court of Justice was also 
called upon because of EURATOM (About this legal “congestion”, see 
HICKS, 1999, p. 1643, which uses the expression “treaty congestion” for 
international environmental law).
Ireland based its argument to the ITLOS for provisional measures 
to immediately stop the activities at the MOX Plant on the precautionary 
principle. According to Ireland, the harmful effects of the plant on the 
marine environment of the region were unknown and might cause serious 
and irreversible environmental damage. Also, the Irish request declared 
that the United Kingdom should prove that this activity would be harmless 
to the environment and that preventive measures, before the scientific 
proof, were required.46
In a decision rendered on 3 December 2001, the ITLOS did not 
recognize the request of Ireland because it held that the plant did not pose 
serious damage to the marine environment and that Ireland was not able to 
prove the urgency and severity of the potential damage (CHO, 2009, p. 64). 
44 Acronym for Mixed Oxide Fuel. All the documents regarding the case in the ITLOS can be found 
at http://www.itlos.org/index.php?id=102&L= 1AND1%3D1. Accessed 21 January 2017. The MOX 
Plant Case (Ireland v. United Kingdom), Provisional Measures.
45 In this sense, STEPHENS, 2010, p. 232 says: “As no nuclear facilities in the United Kingdom 
currently use the mixed uranium and plutonium fuel to generate electricity, MOX fuel is intended for 
export, via the Irish Sea”. 
46 Request for Provisional Measures and Statement of Case submitted by Ireland, at 45, para. 101.
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For the ITLOS, Ireland did not provide evidence of irreparable damage to 
its rights or serious damage to the environment as a result of the operations 
at the MOX plant and that, as a consequence, the precautionary principle 
did not apply in that provisional measure.47
Notwithstanding the refusal by the ITLOS to apply the 
precautionary principle, the decision was extremely important to set the 
standards and more objective rules to the utilization of this principle. To 
avoid the excessive use of the precautionary approach, which could diminish 
its international legitimacy as a result, the ITLOS seized the opportunity 
to clarify the scope and limits of its utilization. In doing so, it emphasized 
the need to specify the severity of the potential damage to the marine 
environment. Thus, to invoke the precautionary principle, the damage to 
be prevented cannot be general and abstract; it must be identifiable and 
clear. In addition, the threat must pose serious or irreversible damage to 
the environment, which was not proven in the MOX Plant case, especially 
because it was a provisional measure and not the analysis of the merits of 
the case (CHO, 2009, p. 64; STEPHENS, 2010, p. 237-238).
In sum, in addition to reaffirming that the precautionary principle 
cannot be used without restriction, this case served as a start to the 
establishment of more objective limits and standards for the preventive 
approach. In international environmental law, not every scientific 
uncertainty can prevent the society from conducting its activities and 
explorations. However, it is clear from the ITLOS’s decision that the 
precautionary approach must be a guiding principle in the law of the sea. 
3.1.3 Responsibilities and Obligations of the States in the 
Activities in the Area 
Among the cases analyzed by the ITLOS, and maybe in all the 
international courts, the Advisory Opinion of 1 February 2011 regarding 
the “Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and 
Entities with Respect to Activities in the Area” is the most significant. 
47 The MOX Plant Case (Ireland v. United Kingdom), Provisional Measures. Available at http://www.
itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_10/Order.03.12.01.E.pdf. Accessed 21 January 
2017. Also: Joint Declaration of Judges Caminos, Yamamoto, Park, Akl, Marsit, Eiriksson and Jesus: 
“Under these circumstances of scientific uncertainty, the Tribunal might have been expected to have 
followed the path it took in the Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases to prescribe a measure preserving the 
existing situation. In its wisdom, it did not do so. It decided, in the circumstances of the case, that, in 
the short period before the constitution of an arbitral tribunal under Annex VII to the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, the urgency of the situation did not require it to lay down, as binding 
legal obligations, the measures requested by Ireland”.
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In this Advisory Opinion, the ITLOS made clear the terms in which the 
precautionary approach must be used in international environmental 
law, contributing very significantly to the development of this principle 
(LAMOTTE, 2011, p. 457).
First of all, the case in question was not a lawsuit; it was an 
advisory opinion.48 The International Seabed Authority requested the 
ITLOS, by means of the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the ITLOS,49 to 
settle the following matters: a) the responsibility of the States in terms of 
sponsoring activities in the area; b) the responsibility of the States for lack 
of compliance with the provisions established by the LOSC; in particular, 
regarding the activities listed in LOSC Article 153, paragraph 2, item “b”; 
and c) the appropriate measures that the States must take in order to fulfil 
their duties and responsibilities, especially with respect to Article 139 and 
Annex III of LOSC, and the 1994 Implementing Agreement (ITLOS. 2011, 
p. 5-6).
The opinion by the ITLOS explains all these questions and, with 
respect to the precautionary principle, it provides great advances, defining 
its manner of application and utilization. It is regarded as an historic 
decision (FREESTONE, 2011, p. 759). In answering the aforementioned 
questions, the advisory opinion identified several obligations directly 
for the sponsoring States,50 such as: provide assistance to the Authority 
in the exercise of the control of the activities in the Area; apply the 
best environmental practices; take measures to ensure the provision of 
guarantees in the case of an emergency order from the Authority to protect 
the marine environment; provide compensation for the damage caused 
by pollution; conduct environmental impact assessments; and apply the 
precautionary principle (ITLOS. 2011, par. 122).
Regarding the precautionary approach, the ITLOS established, 
in paragraphs 125 to 135, the exact limits for its application regarding the 
exploration of polymetallic nodules on the seafloor that, in a certain way, 
48 For a more in-depth study on the prior history, background and procedures of the case, see LA-
MOTTE, 2011, p. 455; CHURCHILL, 2011, p 501-503.
49 Under the terms of LOSC Part XI, the Seabed Disputes Chamber is in charge of solving any con-
troversy involving the seabed, as well as issuing advisory opinions. LOSC Art. 191 and Art. 131 of the 
ITLOS Regulation. About the matter, FREESTONE, 2011, p. 759 says: “This is the first time that the 
advisory jurisdiction of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea has been invoked and the first 
time that the Seabed Disputes Chamber has been called upon”.
50 Sponsoring States are those countries whose state-owned companies and individuals or legal enti-
ties have the same nationality or are in effect controlled by the State, namely, those in LOSC Art. 139, 
par. 1; Art.153, par. 4 ; and Art. 4, par. 4 of LOSC Annex III.
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extend beyond the Area and apply to other marine activities.51 That is, at 
least in the procedural issues and in the limits and rules for the utilization 
of the precautionary principle in international environmental law, the 
ITLOS’s opinion extends beyond the strict guidelines of the opinion.
Regarding the application of the precautionary approach, first, 
the ITLOS begins the advisory opinion emphasizing that the international 
regulations themselves (Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for 
Polymetallic Nodules and Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration 
for Polymetallic Sulphides), which were reviewed in the case in question, 
in addition to other general international documents, state that the 
precautionary approach must be applied and taken into consideration in the 
exploration of the Area.52 The ITLOS decided that, although the general 
documents – like Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration – are not legally 
binding, both Regulations have mandatory application (ITLOS. 2011, par 
127).
Second, the ITLOS used the precautionary concept from 
Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration to establish how and in what situations 
this principle can be invoked: a) it can only be applied in threats of serious 
or irreversible damage to the environment. That is, only in situations of 
a greater risk, in which the environment might suffer damage to a point 
that corrective measures are not able to restore the marine environment 
in a satisfactory manner;53 b) the cost-effectiveness of the precautionary 
actions to be adopted must be analyzed. That is, for their employment, 
the measures to be used must bring more benefits than costs. There are 
situations in which the cost of a certain precautionary action brings more 
harm than the possible damage (ITLOS. 2011, par. 128).
51 There is some discussion and even harsh criticism at times with respect to the scope of applica-
tion of the opinion. That is, the ITLOS understood that the advisory opinion (par. 87) was only about 
the obligations of the States with respect to certain activities described in the international texts that 
we analyzed: ISA, Regulations for Prospecting and Exploration of Polymetallic Nodules (available 
at http://www.isa.org.jm/files/documents/EN/Regs/PN-en.pdf); ISA, Regulations for Prospecting and 
Exploration of Polymetallic Sulphides (http://www.isa.org.jm/files/documents/EN/Regs/Polymetallic 
Sulphides.pdf). Thus, the opinion included only the following activities: “drilling, dredging, coring, 
and excavation; disposal, dumping and discharge into the marine environment of sediment, wastes 
or other effluents; and construction and operation or maintenance of installations, pipelines and other 
devices related to such activities” ((ITLOS. 2011, par. 87). However, two important activities, which 
are even included in the analyzed International Regulations, were not included by the ITLOS: mineral 
transportation and processing. This position of the ITLOS was severely criticized in the literature. 
About the matter, see FREESTONE, 2011, p. 759, which defends the position of the ITLOS.
52 At several locations , both Regulations mention the duty to act with precaution. 
53 The ITLOS does not provide more details about the definition of the “serious damage” capable 
of legitimizing the use of precaution as a principle in international environmental law; it is left to be 
applied on a case-by-case basis. This position is perfectly plausible, because it is not up to the ITLOS 
to come up with all the concepts precisely, and it would also run the risk of excessively restricting its 
application by doing so. 
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Third, the ITLOS alludes to Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration 
with respect to the fact that the precautionary approach must be adopted by 
the States, “according to their capabilities”, which introduces the possibility 
of different uses of the precautionary approach in light of the different 
capabilities of each State (ITLOS. 2011, par. 129). Having said that, the 
ITLOS refers to paragraphs 151 to 163 of the opinion where it covers 
the responsibilities of developing countries. This is a delicate situation in 
which the Tribunal had to establish what the responsibilities would be for 
these States and how they would apply the precautionary approach. That 
is, if the prescription were poorly framed, that could easily leave gaps in 
the application of the measures by the developing countries, which would 
be exempt from – or at least would have fewer – responsibilities in the 
application of the precautionary approach for the protection of the marine 
environment. However, it must be clear that no provision in the LOSC 
– or the 1994 Implementing Agreement – gives preferential treatment 
to developing States with respect to the responsibilities of sponsoring 
countries. Although the international documents have specifications – such 
as LOSC Article 140, paragraph 1, where it states that the activities in 
the Area must take “into particular consideration the interests and needs 
of developing States”; or Article 148, which promotes the participation 
of developing States in activities in the Area –no provision sets different 
responsibilities for developed and developing countries. 
This way, one may initially believe that the requirements for 
the fulfilment of the obligation to apply the precautionary approach may 
be more demanding for the developed countries than for the developing 
countries. However, the reference made to the different capabilities in the 
Rio Declaration does not mean that the developing States are allowed to 
stop following the so-called “best environmental practices”, or even that 
they are exempt from responsibilities. On the contrary, both have the same 
duties and responsibilities in the application of the precautionary approach. 
According to the opinion, this equality is required; otherwise, this could 
lead to a fraud, with companies from a developed State trying to get 
sponsorship and support from a developing State to be submitted to less 
demanding regulations and controls. Such possibility would lead to a new 
kind of “convenience flag”, with a rush of exploration companies in search 
of fiscal and environmental incentives (ITLOS. 2011, par. 159).
Fourth, notwithstanding the specific obligation to use the 
precautionary approach as a guiding principle for the activities in the Area, 
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the ITLOS creates a general obligation of due diligence for the States, 
which is applicable even outside the scope of the case in question.54 The 
due diligence obligation forces the States to take all the necessary measures 
to avoid damage that may result from any marine activity. This obligation 
applies to the situations where the scientific evidence about the scope and 
the potential of the harmful impact of the activity is insufficient, but the 
aforementioned requirements are met (FREESTONE, 2011, p. 758). Thus, 
to the ITLOS, “a sponsoring State would not meet its obligation of due 
diligence if it disregarded those risks. Such disregard would amount to 
a failure to comply with the precautionary approach” (ITLOS. 2011, par. 
131). This implies that the advisory opinion, regarding the precautionary 
principle, is not limited to the specific activities in the Area; it applies to 
any other activity performed in the marine environment.
 The ITLOS, in its analysis of the common expression 
“responsibility to ensure”, which is found in several international 
environmental treaties, interpreted it as a due diligence obligation, closely 
related to the precautionary principle (ITLOS. 2011, par. 110). However, 
one needs to consider the difficulty of describing the content of these 
obligations in specific terms. The notion of caution and due diligence 
changes: first, according to the nature of the activity and of the capability 
of the State to control the risks; second, because it can change in time, 
because the measures that are regarded as being sufficiently diligent at 
a certain point may not be at another, and vice-versa, in light of new 
scientific or technological knowledge. Therefore, the opinion holds that the 
due diligence standard must be the most demanding for high-risk activities 
(ITLOS. 2011, par. 117).
Last, the due diligence measures that the sponsoring States must 
take to meet their responsibilities compel them to enact effective laws. 
There is a determination here that the adoption of administrative laws and 
regulations is necessary. That is because not all obligations of a contracting 
party may be implemented via contract obligations (ITLOS. 2011, par. 
218). Therefore, the content of the duty of caution is inseparable from 
the obligation of the State to act in legislative and administrative terms 
(BORGES, 2016, p. 78).
54 In this sense: ITLOS. 2011, par. 131: “it is appropriate to point out that the precautionary approach is 
also an integral part of the general obligation of due diligence of sponsoring States, which is applicable 
even outside the scope of the Regulations”.
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CONCLUSION
 
The precautionary approach is extremely relevant in a global risk 
society and, as a consequence, in the current international environmental 
law. However, its legal scope and applicability are complex, and continue 
to be, in a certain way, uncertain. The doctrine has long been denied – and 
many still do – its autonomy as an independent principle with mandatory 
application. Be that as it may, with the natural development of the law, the 
precautionary approach has become an objective principle with international 
applicability, especially with respect to the protection of the seas.  
Although we are still not able to safely say that the precautionary 
approach is included in international law as an unchallenged principle, it has 
been given great steps over the last few years in this direction. Particularly 
with the contributions of the international jurisprudence, especially from 
the ITLOS, the precautionary approach is evolving and becoming an 
autonomous principle, with less uncertainty and subjectivity that caused so 
much apprehension for the States and doubt in the doctrine. 
Without denying the importance of other environmental 
principles for the effective protection of the marine environment, the 
precautionary approach has a special place. It requires the implementation 
of specific protection measures from the State, even before any certainty 
about the damage that a certain activity might cause to the environment. 
Due to the complex nature of the environmental damage, difficulties in 
the assessments and often the impossibility to correct the damage, these 
preventive obligations adopted by the law – conventional or from custom 
– have a crucial role in the management of risks.  
Nevertheless, it is acknowledged that the precautionary approach 
still needs to be better regulated and developed. The precautionary approach 
is not accepted as an indisputable principle in international environmental 
law. However, for legal protection of the seas, the principle has been 
increasingly applied, particularly by the ITLOS.
In conclusion, the precautionary approach, invoking the notions 
of risk, scientific uncertainty and irreversible damage, calls the legal domain 
to the solution of environmental issues of a global risk society. In this 
way, it seeks to transform the instruments of responsibility, compensation, 
sustainable development and consideration of the future generations, thereby 
significantly increasing the protection of the environment. The final success 
of the precautionary principle still depends on the progress of and on a few 
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changes in the international institutions, but it is clear that the precautionary 
approach has become a solid principle of international environmental law, 
especially in the protection of the marine environment.  
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